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Abstract	
What	 are	 the	 conditions	 under	 which	 one	 biological	 object	 is	 a	 part	 of	 another	 biological	
object?	 This	 paper	 answers	 this	 question	 by	 developing	 a	 general,	 systematic	 account	 of	
biological	parthood.	I	specify	two	criteria	for	biological	parthood.	Substantial	Spatial	Inclusion	
requires	 biological	 parts	 to	 be	 spatially	 located	 inside	 or	 in	 the	 region	 that	 the	 natural	
boundary	of	the	biological	whole	occupies.	Compositional	Relevance	captures	the	fact	that	a	
biological	part	engages	in	a	biological	process	that	must	make	a	necessary	contribution	to	a	
condition	 that	 is	minimally	 sufficient	 to	 one	 or	more	 of	 the	 characteristic	 behaviors	 of	 the	
biological	whole.	Instead	of	emphasizing	the	diversity	of	part-whole	relations	in	the	biological	
world,	 this	 paper	 asks	 what	 biological	 part-whole	 relations	 have	 in	 common	 and	 what	
constrains	their	existence,	in	general.	After	presenting	the	two	criteria	for	biological	parthood	
I	discuss	in	how	far	my	account	can	cope	with	hard	cases	(e.g.,	redundant	parts)	and	I	reveal	
the	merits	and	limits	of	monism.	
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1		 Introduction	
The	 view	 that	 nature	 is	 divided	 into	 part-whole	 hierarchies	 is	 deeply	 embedded	 in	 the	
sciences,	 for	 instance,	 in	 the	 biological	 sciences.	 Biologists	 represent	 objects	 (e.g.,	 cells)	 as	
being	constituted	of	a	certain	collection	of	organized	parts	(e.g.,	DNA,	mitochondria,	proteins,	
etc.).	 Assumptions	 about	 part-whole	 relations	 are	 involved	 in	 classifications	 of	 biological	
objects	into	kinds	(e.g.,	the	assumption	that	fish	have	gills	as	parts,	whereas	mammals	have	
lungs	as	parts).	Moreover,	the	methodological	principle	that	one	can	understand	the	behavior	
of	a	whole	by	decomposing	it	into	its	parts	and	studying	the	behavior	of	the	parts	is	central	to	
generating	knowledge	in	the	biological	sciences (for	the	limitations	of	reductive	methods	see	
Kaiser	2011,	2015). The	 importance	of	part-whole	 relations	 to	 the	biological	 sciences	 raises	
the	 question	 under	which	 conditions	 something	 is	 a	 part	 of	 a	 biological	whole	 and	what	 it	
means	 that	 the	 parts	 constitute	 the	 whole.	 For	 instance,	 when	 does	 a	 vesicle	 that	 is	
transported	from	the	endoplasmic	reticulum	to	the	Golgi	apparatus	in	a	eukaryotic	cell	cease	
to	be	a	part	of	the	endoplasmic	reticulum	and	become	a	part	of	the	Golgi	apparatus?	Is	the	
case	that	is	attached	to	the	body	of	a	Caddisfly	larva	and	that	promotes	the	larva’s	survival	a	
part	of	 the	 larva	or	does	 it	belong	 to	 the	 larva’s	environment?	Under	which	conditions	 is	a	
particular	species	or	abiotic	factor	(e.g.,	nitrogen)	a	part	of	an	ecosystem?	Does	a	virus	that	
enters	a	host	cell	and	uses	the	cell’s	machinery	and	metabolism	to	replicate	 itself	become	a	
part	of	the	host	cell?	 
	 The	 goal	 of	 this	 paper	 is	 to	 answer	 questions	 like	 these	 by	 developing	 a	 general,	
systematic	 account	 of	 biological	 parthood.	 Such	 an	 account	 specifies	 general	 criteria	 that	
guide	 the	 individuation	 of	 wholes	 and	 parts	 in	 the	 biological	 sciences,	 and	 it	 reveals	 the	
conditions	under	which	biological	objects	 stand	 in	a	part-whole	 relation	 to	each	other.	 The	
central	 question	of	 the	paper	 is	 under	which	 conditions	 is	 one	biological	 object	 x	 a	part	of	
another	biological	object	y.1	 If	 two	biological	objects	 stand	 in	a	part-whole	 relation	 to	each	
other,	 I	 will	 speak	 of	 one	 being	 a	 biological	 part	 of	 the	 other.	 Hence,	 biological	 parthood	
applies	to	biological	objects	only.2	The	question	under	which	conditions	x	is	a	biological	part	
of	y	 is	a	 special	version	of	what	van	 Inwagen	has	called	 the	“special	 composition	question”	
(1990,	 21).	 It	 is	 a	 special	 version	 because	 it	 concerns	 only	 part-whole	 relations	 in	 the	
biological	 world,	 rather	 than	 the	 concept	 of	 a	 part	 in	 general	 (which	 is	 the	 object	 of	
mereology).	This	paper	is	about	biological	parthood,	not	about	parthood	simpliciter.3		
	 Questions	 about	 biological	 parts	 are	 intertwined	 with	 questions	 about	 biological	
individuality.	Typically,	the	concept	of	a	biological	individual	 is	centered	on	but	not	confined	
to	organisms.	Besides	organisms,	also	parts	of	organisms	(e.g.,	genes	and	cells)	and	groups	of	
                                                
1	I	take	biological	objects	to	be	those	objects	that	belong	to	the	domain	of	the	biological	sciences.	
2	For	reasons	of	simplicity,	I	will	often	speak	of	one	object	being	a	biological	part	of	another	object.	This	must	be	
read	synonymously	with	the	claim	that	one	biological	object	is	a	part	of	another	biological	object.		
3	 My	 focus	 on	 biological	 parthood	 is	 not	 driven	 by	 the	 conviction	 that	 biological	 part-whole	 relations	 are	
fundamentally	 different	 from	other	 kinds	 of	 part-whole	 relations.	 In	 fact,	my	 analysis	 yields	 parthood	 criteria	
that	might	be	applied	also	to	non-biological	objects,	for	instance,	in	the	chemical	realm.	
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organisms	(e.g.,	populations)	are	discussed	as	being	biological	 individuals	 (e.g.,	Clarke	2011;	
Wilson	 and	 Barker	 2017).	 Accordingly,	 the	 relata	 of	 many	 part-whole	 relations	 in	 the	
biological	 realm	 will	 be	 biological	 individuals.	 Rather	 than	 focusing	 on	 the	 question	 what	
biological	individuals	are	and	how	they	are	individuated,	this	paper	examines	how	biological	
individuals	 relate	 to	 each	 other,	 in	 particular,	 which	 conditions	 must	 be	 satisfied	 so	 that	
biological	individuals	relate	to	each	other	as	parts	and	wholes.	One	of	my	central	claims	will	
be	that	the	individuation	and	characterization	of	a	biological	individual	as	a	whole	constrains	
the	 individuation	 of	 its	 parts	 in	 several	 ways.	 This	 paper	 uncovers	 the	 various	 kinds	 of	
constraints	by	formulating	different	criteria	for	biological	parthood.	
	 Methodologically,	my	account	of	biological	parthood	arises	from	and	is	sustained	by	an	
analysis	 of	 a	 wide	 variety	 of	 paradigmatic	 examples	 of	 part-whole	 relations	 from	 the	
biological	 sciences.	 My	 analysis	 takes	 into	 account	 actual	 cases	 of	 biological	 part-whole	
relations	as	well	as	the	explanatory	and	investigative	strategies	that	biologists	employ	when	
studying	part-whole	relations.	The	account	of	biological	parthood	that	I	develop	in	this	paper	
is	thus	an	exercise	in	what	I	call	a	metaphysics	of	biological	practice.	First,	it	is	a	metaphysical	
account	because	 it	 aims	at	describing	a	 feature	of	 reality,	namely	part-whole	 relations	 that	
exist	out	there	in	the	biological	world.	 It	provides	an	understanding	of	the	characteristics	of	
biological	part-whole	relations	and	of	the	conditions	under	which	they	hold.	Second,	I	agree	
with	naturalistic	metaphysics	(e.g.,	Ladymann	and	Ross	2007; Chakravartty	2013)	 in	that	we	
should	consult	the	sciences	to	develop	metaphysical	views	about	which	kinds	of	entities	exist	
and	 how	 they	 are	 like.	 But	 instead	 of	 considering	 physical	 theories	 only,	 a	metaphysics	 of	
biological	practice	draws	our	attention	to	the	metaphysical	underpinnings	of	the	non-physical	
sciences,	and	it	develops	metaphysical	claims	that	take	into	account	also	the	non-theoretical	
aspects	of	biological	practice	(e.g.,	scientific	activities,	epistemic	values,	reasoning	strategies;	
Chang	2011,	Waters	2014).4	Because	of	the	relatively	broad	scope	of	my	account	(i.e.,	parts	
and	wholes	 in	 the	biological	world,	 in	general)	 I	 focus	on	analyzing	examples	of	part-whole	
relations	 that	 are	 paradigmatic	 and	 figure	 in	 successful	 biological	 explanations.	 In	 addition,	
my	analysis	is	backed	up	by	philosophical	case	studies	that	are	concerned	with	more	specific	
kinds	of	 part-whole	 relations	 (e.g.,	DNA	 sequences	being	parts	 of	 the	human	genome)	 and	
that	 investigate	 the	concrete	 investigative	practices	and	 reasoning	 strategies	 that	biologists	
employ	(see,	e.g.,	Kaiser	forthc.).	
	 A	 pluralistically	 inclined	philosopher	might	 object	 that	my	 goal	 of	 paying	 attention	 to	
actual	 biological	 practice	 conflicts	 with	 my	 other	 goal	 of	 developing	 a	 general,	 systematic	
                                                
4	I	am	aware	of	the	fact	that	a	metaphysics	of	biological	practice	understood	in	that	way,	presupposes	scientific	
realism	 and	 requires	 an	 account	 of	 which	 elements	 of	 biological	 practice	 allow	 for	 drawing	 metaphysical	
conclusions	(and	which	do	not).	A	promising	approach	is	to	focus	on	successful	and	stable	practices.	However,	it	
is	a	controversial	question	whether	scientific	success	provides	us	with	access	to	the	world,	as	it	really	is.	Those	
skeptical	about	this	might	prefer	to	adopt	a	weaker	view	of	metaphysics,	according	to	which	metaphysics	makes	
general	claims	about	our	conceptual	apparatus,	rather	than	about	the	world	(e.g.,	Strawson	1959).	I	agree	that	
these	 are	 urgent	 and	 very	 interesting	 questions	 but	 they	 lie	 beyond	 the	 scope	of	 this	 paper.	 Fortunately,	my	
analysis	of	biological	parthood	is	compatible	with	both	views	of	metaphysics.	
	 
4 
 
account	of	biological	parthood.	According	to	the	pluralist,	a	monistic	account	that	specifies	a	
single	set	of	criteria	supposed	to	apply	to	all	part-whole	relations	in	the	biological	world	will	
fail	to	capture	the	diversity	of	biological	part-whole	relations	and	of	individuation	practices	in	
the	biological	sciences	(cf.	Kellert,	Longino,	and	Waters	2006).	I	agree	with	the	pluralist	that	it	
might	turn	out	that	only	a	pluralistic	notion	of	biological	parthood	that	recognizes	different,	
perhaps	conflicting	parthood	criteria	(such	as	Wimsatt	1972,	2007)	accounts	for	the	diversity	
of	 biological	 practice.	 However,	 diversity	 and	 difference	 is	 only	 one	 aspect	 of	 biological	
practice	 that	 philosophers	 can	 and	 should	 account	 for	 (Kaiser	 2015,	 Chapter	 2).	 From	 a	
philosophical	perspective,	 it	 is	also	interesting	to	zoom	out	and	look	for	generalities	and	for	
similarities	 between	different	practices	of	 individuating	parts	 and	wholes.	When	 traditional	
metaphysicians	 argue	 about	 the	 general	 structure	 of	 reality,	 they	 adopt	 such	 a	 general	
perspective	and	develop	philosophical	views	that	are	supposed	to	apply	universally.	I	think	we	
should	not	reject	the	monistic	aspirations	of	traditional	metaphysics	too	hastily	because	we	
can	 learn	a	 lot	 from	striving	 for	monism	and	 from	analyzing	 the	obstacles	we	meet.	Hence,	
the	aim	of	my	paper	is	twofold.	First,	I	develop	a	monistic	account	of	biological	parthood	that	
proposes	 two	 general,	 necessary	 conditions	 for	 the	 existence	 of	 biological	 part-whole	
relations,	 and	 I	 show	 why	 these	 criteria	 are	 preferable	 to	 alternative	 criteria.	 Second,	 my	
analysis	 enables	 me	 to	 explain	 why	 the	 search	 for	 a	 monistic	 account	 that	 specifies	
individually	 necessary	 and	 jointly	 sufficient	 criteria	 for	 biological	 parthood	 is	 so	 difficult.	
Understanding	the	reasons	 for	 these	difficulties	delivers	valuable	 insights	 into	the	nature	of	
biological	part-whole	relations.	
	 This	paper	is	organized	as	follows.	In	Section	2,	I	distinguish	different	kinds	of	questions	
that	one	 can	ask	 concerning	biological	parthood,	 and	 I	 specify	 the	 relata	of	biological	 part-
whole	 relations.	 Section	 3	 develops	 spatial	 inclusion	 as	 the	 first	 criterion	 for	 biological	
parthood	 and	 introduces	 the	 notion	 of	 a	 natural	 boundary,	 which	 is	 central	 to	 the	 spatial	
inclusion	 criterion.	 In	 Section	 4,	 I	 develop	 the	 second	 criterion	 for	 biological	 parthood,	
compositional	 relevance,	 which	 refers	 to	 the	 characteristic	 behaviors	 of	 the	 whole	 and	
specifies	the	relevance	condition	in	terms	of	an	insufficient	but	necessary	part	of	a	condition	
that	 is	 unnecessary	 but	 sufficient	 (INUS-condition).	 In	 Section	 5,	 I	 discuss	 in	 how	 far	 my	
account	of	biological	parthood	can	deal	with	hard	cases,	such	as	redundant	parts	or	collective	
parts.	 I	 conclude	 in	 Section	 6	 by	 revealing	 the	 merits	 and	 limits	 of	 a	 monistic	 account	 of	
biological	parthood.	
	
2		 Preliminaries	
2.1	 Relating	Different	Part-Whole	Questions	
I	shall	call	the	question	of	whether	a	particular	biological	object	x	(e.g.,	a	vesicle)	is	a	part	of	
another	 biological	 object	 y	 (e.g.,	 the	 Golgi	 apparatus)	 the	 parthood	 question.	 It	 is	 closely	
related	to	but	less	demanding	than	the	decomposition	question,	which	asks	for	not	only	one	
but	for	all	parts	into	which	a	whole	is	partitioned.	My	account	of	biological	parthood	focuses	
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on	the	relation	between	one	biological	part	and	its	whole	(i.e.,	on	the	parthood	question)	and	
specifies	the	conditions	under	which	this	one-to-one	relation	holds.	From	this	 focus,	 it	does	
not	 follow	that	 the	other	parts	of	 the	whole	are	 irrelevant	 to	the	existence	of	a	part-whole	
relation.	On	the	contrary,	several	authors	have	drawn	attention	to	the	fact	that	a	biological	
part	always	 is	 a	member	of	a	 team	of	parts	 that	 interact	with	each	other	 in	 very	 “intense”	
(Simon	1962,	Haugeland	1998,	McShea	2000)	or	“productive”	ways	(Machamer,	Darden,	and	
Craver	2000,	Gillett	2013)	and	that	exhibit	a	special	“jointness”	 (Fagan	2012).	How,	exactly,	
the	existence	of	a	particular	part-whole	relation	depends	on	other	parts	of	the	same	whole	
will	be	examined	in	Section	4.	This	dependency	does	not	imply	that	answering	the	parthood	
question	 presupposes	 answering	 the	 decomposition	 question.	 We	 can	 individuate	 one	
particular	biological	object	as	a	part	of	a	whole	without	having	decomposed	the	whole	into	all	
of	its	parts	(but	not	without	knowing	some	of	the	other	parts).	
	 Whether	a	particular	object	 is	a	biological	part	of	another	object,	the	whole,	does	not	
only	depend	on	the	other	parts	but	also,	and	in	particular,	on	how	the	whole	is	individuated	
and	by	which	properties	and	behaviors	it	is	characterized.	I	shall	call	the	question	‘What	is	the	
whole,	 how	 can	 it	 be	 individuated	 and	 characterized?’	 the	 individuation-of-the-whole	
question.	A	 central	 idea	 that	 I	will	 elaborate	 in	 the	 following	 sections	 is	 that	answering	 the	
individuation-of-the-whole	 question	 constrains	 answering	 the	 parthood	 question.	 In	 other	
words,	 which	 object	 I	 pick	 out	 as	 the	 whole	 and	 how	 I	 characterize	 its	 properties,	 typical	
behaviors,	and	spatial	boundaries	constrains	what	counts	as	a	biological	part	of	 this	whole.	
For	instance,	biologists	do	not	treat	a	green	alga	that	is	spatially	included	in	a	fungus	as	a	part	
of	the	fungus.	However,	if	the	whole	is	referred	to	as	a	lichen,	the	green	alga	will	be	a	part	of	
the	lichen.	Likewise,	if	biologists	conceive	of	a	genome	as	having	a	specific	chemical	structure	
(i.e.,	as	consisting	of	DNA	only)	transcription	factors	and	histones	fail	to	be	biological	parts	of	
the	 genome	 because	 they	 are	 proteins.	 By	 contrast,	 if	 biologists	 characterize	 a	 genome	 in	
purely	functional	terms	(e.g.,	as	guiding	development)	transcription	factors	and	histones	turn	
out	 to	 be	 biological	 parts	 of	 the	 genome	because	 they	 are	 central	 to	 gene	 regulation.	 The	
criteria	for	biological	parthood	that	I	develop	in	this	paper	specify	the	different	ways	in	which	
the	individuation	of	the	whole	constrains	the	individuation	of	its	parts.	
	 The	 individuation-of-the-whole	 question	must	 be	 distinguished	 from	 the	demarcation	
question,	which	concerns	 the	outer	boundary	of	 the	whole	and	asks	how	the	whole	can	be	
demarcated	from	its	context.	One	might	claim	that	answering	the	demarcation	question	boils	
down	 to	 answering	 the	 decomposition	 question	 because	 to	 demarcate	 an	 object	 from	 its	
context	 is	 nothing	 but	 identifying	 all	 of	 its	 parts	 and	 classifying	 all	 non-parts	 as	 context.	 In	
Section	 3.1,	 I	 shall	 argue	 that	 this	 view	 invites	 a	 circularity	 objection,	 which	 can	 only	 be	
avoided	by	a	substantial	notion	of	a	spatial	boundary	that	allows	us	to	demarcate	an	object	
from	 its	 environment	 independently	 of	 individuating	 all	 of	 its	 parts.	 In	 other	 words,	 I	 will	
argue	 that	 answering	 the	 demarcation	 question	 is	 independent	 of	 answering	 the	
decomposition	 question.	 Identifying	 what	 I	 will	 refer	 to	 as	 the	 ‘natural	 boundary’	 of	 a	
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biological	object	may	be	one	aspect	of	individuating	the	object	as	a	whole.5	Hence,	answering	
the	demarcation	question	may	be	part	of	answering	the	individuation-of-the-whole	question.	
	 In	sum,	we	must	distinguish	four	questions	concerning	part-whole	relations:	
Part-Whole	Questions	
(1) Individuation-of-the-whole	question:	What	is	the	whole,	how	can	it	be	identified?	
(2) Demarcation	question:	Where	does	the	outer	boundary	of	the	whole	run?	How	can	
the	whole	be	demarcated	from	its	context?	
(3) Decomposition	question:	Into	which	collection	of	parts	can	the	whole	be	
decomposed?	
(4) Parthood	question:	Is	a	given	biological	object	a	part	of	another	biological	object,	the	
whole?	
	
2.2		 The	Relata	of	Biological	Part-Whole	Relations	
Claims	about	part-whole	relations	in	the	biological	sciences	typically	concern	types	or	kinds	of	
objects,	 not	 tokens.	 For	 instance,	 all	 individuals	 of	 the	 kind	 lichen	 are	 composed	 of	 green	
algae	 and	 fungi,	 not	 only	 a	 particular	 lichen.	 The	 fact	 that	 science	 is	 often	 concerned	with	
kinds	 of	 part-whole	 relations,	 however,	 does	 not	 imply	 that	 the	 part-whole	 relation	 itself	
holds	 between	 types	 or	 kinds.6	 Depending	 on	 one’s	 ontology,	 kinds	 might	 be	 viewed	 as	
abstract	entities	 (e.g.,	universals)	 that	do	not	exist	 in	 space	and	 time,	or	 they	might	not	be	
said	to	exist	at	all	–	at	least	not	independently	of	our	classification	practices.	It	seems	to	me	
that	the	more	parsimonious	and	less	controversial	assumption	to	start	with	is	that	part-whole	
relations	in	the	biological	realm	relate	token	objects	that	exist	in	space	and	time.	The	account	
of	biological	parthood	that	I	develop	in	this	paper	is	thus	a	singularist	account.7	According	to	a	
singularist	 account	 of	 biological	 parthood,	 part-whole	 relations	 exist	 between	 individual	
biological	objects	and	claims	about	kinds	of	biological	part-whole	relations	are	generalizations	
that	arise	from	investigating	particular	part-whole	relations.	
	 Even	if	kinds	are	not	the	relata	of	biological	part-whole	relations,	they	are	still	relevant	
to	 the	 conditions	under	which	biological	 part-whole	 relations	exist.	Whether	 two	particular	
biological	 objects	 are	 related	 as	 part	 and	 whole	 depends	 also	 on	 the	 kinds	 to	 which	 they	
belong.	To	see	this,	consider	the	question	of	whether	a	virus	that	has	infected	a	host	cell	is	a	
part	of	it.	Answering	this	question	depends	not	only	on	how	biologists	individuate	the	whole	
but	 also	 on	 how	 they	 classify	 it.	 Viruses	 are	 surely	 not	 among	 the	 parts	 that	 cells	 have,	 in	
general.	 But	 they	 may	 be	 parts	 of	 a	 subtype	 of	 cells,	 namely	 infected	 host	 cells.	 A	 virus	
normally	does	not	contribute	to	but	often	hinders	the	behaviors	that	are	typical	for	objects	of	
                                                
5	 For	 instance,	 biologists	 spatially	 characterize	 a	 cell	 as	 being	 surrounded	 by	 a	 cell	membrane	 and	 insects	 as	
being	surrounded	by	an	exoskeleton	with	a	particular	shape	and	structure.	
6	This	 is	not	a	trivial	point	because	some	authors	claim	that	part-whole	or	constitutive	relations	exist	between	
properties	or	types	of	events	(e.g.,	Harbecke	2010).	
7	My	singularist	account	is	in	accordance	with	the	fact	that	the	part-whole	relation	in	the	classical,	mereological	
sense	is	conceived	of	as	a	first-order	relation	between	individuals.	
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the	kind	“cell”,	such	as	growth,	DNA	replication,	protein	synthesis,	and	cell	division.	A	token	
object	 that	belongs	 to	 the	kind	“host	 cell”,	by	contrast,	 is	 characterized	by	different	 typical	
behaviors,	such	as	reduced	cell	defenses,	viral	replication,	and	release	of	viruses.	The	virus	is	a	
biological	part	of	a	cell	of	the	kind	host	cell	because	the	virus	is	essential	to	the	characteristic	
behaviors	of	host	cells.8	I	will	pick	up	this	point	in	Section	4.1	when	I	explain	the	notion	of	a	
characteristic	 behavior	 in	 more	 detail	 and	 incorporate	 it	 into	 my	 second	 criterion	 for	
biological	 parthood.	 To	 be	 clear,	my	 claim	 that	 kinds	 are	 relevant	 to	 the	 conditions	 under	
which	 biological	 part-whole	 relations	 exist	 does	 not	 imply	 that	 the	 existence	 of	 biological	
part-whole	 relations	 depends	 on	 classification	 preferences	 of	 individual	 biologists.	 Not	 any	
biological	kind	that	one	might	 think	of	 is	scientifically	 legitimate	and	 thus	can	be	said	to	be	
real	(in	a	promiscuous	way;	Dupré	1993,	36).	Hence,	from	the	fact	that	biological	part-whole	
relations	exist	only	relative	to	specific	kinds	it	does	neither	follow	that	biological	parthood	is	
subjective,	nor	does	it	follow	that	my	account	of	biological	parthood	is	epistemological	rather	
than	metaphysical	in	character.	
	 Some	 philosophers	 might	 agree	 that	 part-whole	 relations	 exist	 between	 tokens	 but	
reject	the	view	that	material	objects	–	understood	in	accordance	with	endurantism9	–	are	the	
appropriate	 relata	 of	 part-whole	 relations.	 Process	 ontologists	 argue	 that	 an	object-bias	 or	
“substance	paradigm”	 (Seibt	 2016)	 fails	 to	 acknowledge	 the	processual	 nature	of	 the	 living	
world	(e.g.,	Whitehead	1929;	Rescher	1996,	2000;	Seibt	2003;	Dupré	2012;	O’Malley	2014).	I	
agree	 that	 the	 ontological	 category	 of	 processes	 (or	 occurrents,	 which	 include	 processes,	
events,	and	states)	is	important	to	capture	the	constantly	changing,	complex	biological	world	
(see	Kaiser	and	Krickel	2016).	However,	 this	does	not	 commit	one	 to	 the	 radical	 claim	 that	
“everything	 is	 process”	 (Bickhard	 2011,	 95)10	 and	 that	 part-whole	 relations	 must	 exist	
between	processes	only.	It	is	possible	to	identify	material	objects	as	the	relata	of	part-whole	
relations	and	yet	to	acknowledge	the	importance	of	processes.	As	my	analysis	will	show,	the	
processes	 in	which	 biological	 objects	 are	 involved	 co-determine	whether	 these	 objects	 are	
related	 as	 parts	 and	 wholes.	 A	 static	 view	 of	 biological	 parthood	 that	 considers	 only	 the	
properties	 of	 and	 relations	 between	 material	 objects	 at	 a	 certain	 time	 is	 thus	 highly	
implausible.	 Biological	 part-whole	 relations	 essentially	 involve	 processes,	 even	 though	
processes	are	not	the	relata	of	part-whole	relations.11	
                                                
8	 There	 are	 several	 other	 examples	 that	 support	 this	 claim.	 For	 instance,	 the	 F1	 subunit	 seems	 not	 to	 be	 a	
biological	part	of	a	protein	of	the	kind	“transmembrane	protein”,	but	rather	a	biological	part	of	a	protein	of	the	
kind	“ATP	synthase”.	
9	Endurantists	believe	that	material	objects	have	spatial	parts	but	no	temporal	parts	and	that	material	objects	
are	 wholly	 present	 whenever	 they	 exist.	 By	 contrast,	 perdurantists	 claim	 that	 material	 objects	 are	 four-
dimensional	space-time	worms	that	are	extended	over	time	and	that	have	also	temporal	parts.	
10	It	is	unclear	whether	there	is	any	philosopher	of	biology	who	subscribes	to	the	radical	view	that	only	processes	
exist.	Dupré	claims	that	biological	entities,	such	as	organisms	and	genomes,	are	dynamical,	constantly	changing	
entities,	 which	 cannot	 be	 understood	 in	 terms	 of	 “properties	 of	 and	 relations	 between	 their	 structural	
constituents”	(Dupré	2012,	8).	
11	Along	these	lines	one	might	add	that	a	part-whole	relation	between	biological	objects	does	not	only	depend	
on	the	processes	they	implement	but	also	on	the	properties	and	powers	they	possess	(Gillett	2013).		
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	 To	 conclude,	 I	 assume	 that	 part-whole	 relations	 in	 the	 biological	 world	 each	 exist	
between	 particular	 biological	 objects.	 My	 heart,	 for	 example,	 is	 a	 biological	 part	 of	 my	
circulatory	system.	Despite	this	focus	on	particulars	and	on	material	objects,	I	argue	that	we	
can	 only	 understand	 the	 conditions	 under	 which	 a	 certain	 part-whole	 relation	 exists	 if	 we	
broaden	 our	 perspective	 and	 take	 into	 account	 also	 other	 parts	 of	 the	 same	 whole,	 the	
processes	in	which	the	objects	are	involved,	and	the	kinds	to	which	they	belong.	The	criteria	
for	 biological	 parthood	 that	 I	 develop	 in	 the	 following	 sections	 explicate	 how	 other	 parts,	
processes	and	kinds	determine	the	existence	of	biological	part-whole	relations.	
	
3	 Spatial	Inclusion	
3.1	 Why	a	Primitive	Notion	of	Spatial	Inclusion	Fails	
A	widespread	 and	 intuitively	 plausible	 view	 is	 that	 the	parts	 of	material	 objects	 are	 spatial	
parts.	There	is	a	dispute	in	metaphysics	about	whether	material	objects	have	temporal	parts	
as	well,	as	the	perdurantist	believes,	but	everybody	agrees	that	material	objects	have	at	least	
spatial	parts.	To	be	a	spatial	part	of	a	whole	means	to	be	spatially	included	or	contained	in	the	
whole,	 that	 is,	 to	 be	 located	 inside	 the	 spatial	 boundary	 that	 continuously	 surrounds	 the	
whole.	The	view	that	something	is	a	part	if	it	is	spatially	included	in	the	whole	seems	to	apply	
to	the	biological	world	as	well	 (see	Craver	2007,	Clarke	2011,	Gillett	2013).	Chloroplasts	are	
parts	 of	 cells	 because	 they	 are	 located	 inside	 cells.	 My	 liver	 is	 a	 part	 of	 me	 because	 it	 is	
spatially	 included	 in	 me.	 An	 individual	 black-headed	 gull	 is	 a	 part	 of	 a	 certain	 population	
because	it	is	located	in	the	spatial	distribution	of	that	population.	A	green	alga	is	a	part	of	a	
lichen	because	 it	 is	contained	 in	 the	 lichen.	Bases	on	 these	 intuitions,	you	might	suggest	 to	
specify	biological	parthood	as	primitive	spatial	inclusion:	
	
Primitive	Spatial	Inclusion	(PSI)	
An	object	x	is	a	biological	part	of	an	object	y	if	and	only	if	
x	is	spatially	included	in	y,	that	is,	x	is	located	inside	the	continuous	spatial	boundary	of	y.12	
	
	 Despite	 its	 initial	 plausibility,	 paradigmatic	 examples	 of	 part-whole	 relations	 from	
biological	practice	show	that	spatial	inclusion	is	neither	sufficient	nor	necessary	for	biological	
parthood.	Consider	first	why	it	is	not	sufficient.	In	the	case	of	lichens	green	algae	are	spatially	
included	in	the	fungus	but	they	are	not	conceived	of	as	parts	of	the	fungus	(rather,	they	are	
parts	of	the	composite	organism,	the	lichen).	Similarly,	if	a	doctor	leaves	a	cotton	ball	inside	
of	my	stomach	during	surgery	we	would	not	say	that	the	cotton	ball	became	a	part	of	me	just	
because	it	is	spatially	located	inside	of	me.	Another	example	is	the	individuation	of	the	parts	
of	 the	 human	 genome.	 According	 to	 ENCODE	 (2012),	 not	 any	 arbitrary	 DNA	 sequence	
contained	in	the	human	genome	is	a	biological	part	of	it	(Kaiser	forthc.).	Examples	like	these	
                                                
12	Note	that	spatial	 inclusion	does	not	require	spatial	contact	or	proximity	among	the	objects	that	are	spatially	
included	in	Y.	Spatial	contact	or	proximity	may	have	an	 influence	on	part-whole	relations	(e.g.,	by	allowing	for	
causal	interactions)	but	it	is	not	presupposed	by	spatial	inclusion.	
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are	widespread	in	the	biological	sciences.	They	show	that	there	is	more	to	biological	parthood	
than	 spatial	 inclusion	 and	 that	 PSI	 specifies	 a	 criterion	 for	 biological	 parthood	 that	 is	 not	
sufficient.	
	 Other	 cases	 show	 that	 spatial	 inclusion	 is	not	even	necessary	 for	biological	 parthood.	
Take	 the	 example	 of	 a	 population	 of	 black-headed	 gulls.	 As	 an	 individual,	 it	 might	 have	 a	
specific	 spatial	 distribution	 (e.g.,	 at	 the	 North	 Sea	 coast	 around	 Büsum)	 but	 this	 does	 not	
preclude	 that	 some	members	 of	 that	 population	 are	 located	 outside	 of	 this	 region	 (if	 they	
potentially	interbreed	with	members	located	in	that	region).	In	general,	populations	seem	not	
to	 be	 the	 kind	 of	 objects	 whose	 identity	 depends	 on	 having	 a	 specific	 spatial	 boundary,	
contrary	 to,	 for	 instance,	 cells	 or	 mitochondria	 that	 are	 necessarily	 surrounded	 by	 a	
membrane.	 Gene	 regulatory	 networks	 and	 ecosystems	 are	 further	 examples	 of	 biological	
objects	whose	parts	seem	not	to	be	held	together	by	what	I	will	call	a	natural	boundary	(see	
next	 section).	 PSI	 thus	 fails	 to	provide	even	a	necessary	 criterion	 for	 the	existence	of	 part-
whole	relations	in	the	biological	world.	
	 Finally,	PSI	 is	problematic	because	 it	runs	the	risk	of	being	circular	(or	trivial).	PSI	says	
that	 biological	 parts	 of	 a	whole	must	 be	 spatially	 included	 in	 the	whole,	which	means	 that	
they	must	 be	 located	 inside	 the	 spatial	 boundary	 of	 the	whole.	 This	 raises	 the	 question	 of	
what	 is	 the	 spatial	 boundary	 of	 the	 whole	 and	 how	 can	 it	 be	 identified	 (the	 demarcation	
question,	 recall	 Section	 2.1).	 The	 simplest	 answer	 is	 that	we	 demarcate	 an	 object	 from	 its	
context	 by	 identifying	 all	 of	 its	 parts	 and	 drawing	 a	 three-dimensional	 boundary	 that	
encompasses	all	parts	and	a	minimal	set	of	other	objects	(this	is	similar	to	what	Kaplan	2012	
proposes).	 This	 suggestion,	 however,	 renders	 PSI	 circular	 because	whether	 x	 is	 a	 biological	
part	of	y	would	depend	on	whether	x	is	spatially	included	inside	the	boundary	around	y	and	
y’s	other	parts.	 In	other	words,	 the	 individuation	of	one	part	of	a	whole	would	presuppose	
having	 individuated	 all	 of	 its	 parts.	 For	 example,	whether	 the	 case	 of	 a	 Caddisfly	 larva	 is	 a	
biological	part	of	the	larva	would	depend	on	whether	it	is	located	inside	the	spatial	boundary	
that	surrounds	all	parts	of	the	larva.	To	avoid	the	circularity	of	the	spatial	inclusion	criterion	
we	 must	 find	 a	 way	 to	 individuate	 the	 spatial	 boundary	 of	 the	 whole	 independently	 of	
individuating	 its	parts.	The	next	section	 introduces	 the	notion	of	a	natural	boundary,	which	
provides	us	with	such	an	independent	demarcation	of	biological	objects.	
	
3.2	 Natural	Boundaries	
The	main	idea	behind	the	notion	of	a	natural	boundary	 is	that	there	exist	boundaries	in	the	
biological	world	 that	are	of	particular	 importance	 to	 the	 identity	of	many	biological	objects	
and	to	individuating	their	parts.	Paradigmatic	cases	of	natural	boundaries	include	the	skin	of	
mammals,	 the	exoskeleton	of	 insects,	 the	cell	wall	of	plant	 cells,	other	membranes	 such	as	
the	blood-brain	barrier	or	the	alveolar-capillary	membrane,	and	also	things	such	as	rivers	or	
thick	 lines	of	scrub.	 I	 refer	 to	 these	boundaries	as	“natural”	 to	emphasize	 that	 they	exist	 in	
reality,	 rather	 than	being	 introduced	 solely	 through	human	demarcation.	 In	 short,	 they	 are	
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“bona	 fide	 boundaries”,	 not	 “fiat	 boundaries”	 (Smith	 and	 Varzi	 2000,	 401).13	 Not	 all	
boundaries	 that	 biologists	 draw	 –	 for	 instance,	 when	 identifying	 the	 target	 of	 their	
investigation	 –	 correspond	 to	 natural	 boundaries.	 Sometimes	 biologists	 are	 interested	 in	
questions	 that	 require	 studying	an	object	 together	with	parts	of	 its	 environment.	On	other	
times	 they	 ignore	 parts	 of	 an	 object	 because	 they	 are	 irrelevant	 to	 the	 behavior	 they	
investigate.		
	 	Demarcating	a	biological	object,	 the	whole,	 from	 its	 context	by	 identifying	 its	natural	
boundary	 is	 independent	 in	 two	 respects.	 First,	 it	 does	 not	 require	 identifying	 all	 of	 the	
biological	 parts	 of	 the	 whole	 (i.e.,	 answering	 the	 demarcation	 question	 does	 not	 require	
answering	 the	 decomposition	 question).	 Second,	 demarcating	 a	 biological	 object	 by	
identifying	 its	 natural	 boundary	 is	 independent	 from	 characterizing	 the	 natural	 boundary,	
itself,	 as	 a	 biological	 part	 (i.e.,	 answering	 the	 demarcation	 question	 does	 not	 require	
answering	 the	parthood	question	about	 the	natural	 boundary).	 These	 independencies	 arise	
from	 the	 fact	 that	 natural	 boundaries	 typically	 are	 identified	 by	 their	 function	 as	 selective	
barriers	and	by	the	material	discontinuities	or	structural	differences	that	they	involve.	Let	me	
explain	this	in	more	detail.		
	 First,	natural	boundaries	that	demarcate	individuals	function	as	selective	barriers.	They	
bind	together	the	objects	that	are	located	inside	of	it	and	separate	them	from	what	is	outside.	
In	most	 cases,	 this	 separation	 will	 not	 be	 complete	 but	 rather	 selective.	 For	 instance,	 the	
nuclear	 membrane	 ensures	 that	 ribosomes	 stay	 outside	 the	 nucleus	 but	 its	 nuclear	 pore	
complexes	allow	some	molecules	 to	pass	 (e.g.,	mRNAs	with	 specific	 signal	 sequences).	As	a	
result,	natural	boundaries	reduce	the	causal	interactions	between	objects	inside	and	objects	
outside	of	them	(e.g.,	between	ribosomes	and	intranuclear	mRNAs)	and	allow	specific	kinds	of	
causal	 interactions	among	 the	objects	 they	encompass	 (e.g.,	between	mRNAs	and	enzymes	
during	mRNA	processing).	The	fact	that	interactions	between	the	parts	of	a	whole	and	parts	
of	its	environment	are	generally	fewer	and	weaker	than	the	interactions	among	the	parts	of	
the	whole	 is	 the	 guiding	 idea	 of	 so-called	 intensity-of-interactions	 approaches	 to	 parthood	
(e.g.,	 Simon	1962;	Wimsatt	 1972,	 2007;	Haugeland	1998;	McShea	 2000;	McShea	 and	Venit	
2001).		
	 Second,	 natural	 boundaries	 usually	 involve	 material	 discontinuities	 or	 structural	
differences	(e.g.,	differences	in	the	chemical	structure,	texture,	or	material	constitution).	The	
cell	membrane,	for	instance,	is	composed	of	a	lipid	bilayer	and	transmembrane	proteins	and,	
as	 such,	 forms	a	unit	 that	has	a	different	material	 constitution	and	chemical	 structure	 than	
what	 is	 located	 outside	 and	 inside	 of	 it.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 the	 membrane	 of	 blood	 cells,	 for	
instance,	the	cytoplasm	(inside)	consists	of	a	complex	mixture	of	cell	organelles,	cytoskeleton	
                                                
13	Artificially	produced	biological	objects	(e.g.,	in	synthetic	biology)	can	have	natural	boundaries	as	well	because	
the	term	‘natural’	denotes	the	independent	existence	of	these	boundaries	in	the	natural	world,	not	their	natural	
origin.	
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filaments,	dissolved	molecules,	and	water,	and	the	blood	plasma	(outside)	consists	mainly	of	
water.14	
	 In	 sum,	 natural	 boundaries	 exist	 in	 the	 natural	 world	 (independent	 from	 human	
demarcation),	 and	 they	 are	 individuated	by	 their	 functions	 as	 selective	 barriers	 and	by	 the	
structural	 differences	 and	 material	 discontinuities	 they	 involve.	 Natural	 boundaries	 play	 a	
crucial	role	in	determining	what	is	a	part	of	a	biological	individual	and	what	is	not.	In	the	next	
section	 I	 use	 the	 notion	 of	 a	 natural	 boundary	 to	 substantiate	 the	 condition	 of	 spatial	
inclusion	 and	 to	 turn	 it	 into	 a	 plausible	 criterion	 for	 biological	 parthood,	 which	 avoids	 the	
three	 objections	 that	 a	 primitive	 notion	 of	 spatial	 inclusion	 faces	 (recall	 Section	 3.1).	 The	
substantial	criterion	of	spatial	 inclusion	 that	 I	develop	 in	 the	next	section	relies	on	the	 idea	
that	 natural	 boundaries	 constrain	 relations	 between	 biological	 parts	 and	 biological	wholes.	
However,	 it	 does	 not	 imply	 that	 any	 natural	 boundary	 demarcates	 biological	 individuals	
(because	 other	 necessary	 conditions	 might	 not	 be	 satisfied),	 nor	 does	 it	 imply	 that	 any	
biological	 individual	 must	 be	 demarcated	 by	 a	 natural	 boundary	 (because	 there	 can	 be	
individuals	without	natural	boundaries).	
	
3.3	 A	Substantial	Criterion	of	Spatial	Inclusion	
The	 leading	 idea	 of	 developing	 a	 substantial	 spatial	 inclusion	 criterion	 is	 that	 natural	
boundaries	 of	 biological	 objects	 constrain	 the	 individuation	 of	 their	 parts	 insofar	 as	 their	
biological	parts	must	be	spatially	included	in	or	inside	the	natural	boundary	of	the	object.	The	
dung	 ball	 that	 a	 dorbeetle	 rolls	 is	 not	 a	 biological	 part	 of	 the	 beetle	 because	 it	 is	 located	
outside	its	exoskeleton;	the	neurotransmitter	molecule	is	not	a	part	of	the	neuron	because	it	
is	located	in	the	synaptic	cleft	outside	the	cell	membrane	of	the	neuron;	and	a	green	alga	is	
discussed	 to	 be	 a	 biological	 part	 of	 the	 lichen	 because	 it	 is	 located	 inside	 the	 fungal	
membrane.	 Paradigmatic	 cases	 like	 these	 give	 rise	 to	 the	 following	 substantive	 notion	 of	
spatial	inclusion	as	a	criterion	for	biological	parthood. 	
	
Substantial	Spatial	Inclusion	(SSI)	
An	object	x	is	a	biological	part	of	an	object	y	only	if	
(1)		 if	y	has	a	natural	boundary,	x	must	be	spatially	located	inside	or	in	the	region	that	the	
natural	boundary	occupies.	
	
This	criterion	explicates	one	way	that	the	nature	of	the	whole	–	in	this	case,	its	spatial	nature,	
that	is,	its	feature	of	possessing	a	specific	natural	boundary	–	constrains	the	individuation	of	
its	biological	parts.	The	disjunction	‘inside	or	in	the	region	of’	is	important	because	it	captures	
also	cases	where	a	biological	part	is	located	in	the	natural	boundary	itself,	such	as	a	receptor	
molecule	or	an	ion	channel	that	are	located	in	the	region	that	the	cell	membrane	occupies.	
                                                
14	This	is	compatible	with	the	fact	that	some	natural	boundaries	are	scattered	(e.g.,	of	the	Golgi	apparatus).	
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	 SSI	avoids	all	the	three	problems	that	a	primitive	notion	of	spatial	inclusion	faces	(recall	
Section	3.1).	First,	SSI	is	not	formulated	as	a	sufficient	condition	for	biological	parthood.	In	the	
next	sections,	I	will	supplement	SSI	by	an	additional	criterion	that	allows	distinguishing	cases	
of	mere	spatial	containment	from	cases	of	genuine	biological	parthood	(cf.	Jansen	and	Schulz	
2014).	 Second,	 even	 though	 natural	 boundaries	 are	 of	 great	 importance	 to	 the	 identity	 of	
biological	objects	and	co-determine	their	parts,	this	is	not	true	for	all	cases.	Some	biological	
objects,	such	as	gene	regulatory	networks,	immune	systems,	certain	populations	and	certain	
ecosystems,	 do	 not	 possess	 natural	 boundaries.	 Nevertheless,	 we	 can	 retain	 SSI	 as	 a	
necessary	condition	if	we	formulate	it	conditionally,	that	is,	if	we	require	biological	parts	to	be	
spatially	 included	 in	 their	 wholes	 only	 if	 the	 wholes	 possess	 natural	 boundaries.	 The	
conditional	form	of	SSI	accounts	for	cases	in	which	spatial	inclusion	is	irrelevant	to	biological	
part-whole	relations.	Third,	in	the	previous	section,	I	have	characterized	natural	boundaries	as	
involving	 material	 discontinuities	 or	 structural	 differences	 and	 as	 functioning	 as	 selective	
barriers.	These	structural	and	functional	features	ensure	that	natural	boundaries	of	biological	
objects	can	be	individuated	independently	from	identifying	their	parts.	Hence,	by	referring	to	
the	 spatial	 boundary	 of	 a	 biological	 object	 as	 a	 natural	 boundary	 SSI	 avoids	 the	 circularity	
objection	because	where	the	natural	boundary	of	the	whole	runs	is	 independent	from	what	
its	parts	are.		
	
4.	 Compositional	Relevance	
Paradigmatic	examples	of	biological	part-whole	relations	show	that	biological	parts	are	bound	
together	 to	a	whole	not	only	spatially	but	also	causally-functionally.	To	get	an	 idea	of	what	
this	 means	 consider	 the	 following	 reasoning	 strategies	 for	 why	 something	 is	 a	 part	 of	 a	
biological	object	that	can	be	found	in	biological	practice.	A	vesicle	in	the	cytoplasm	of	a	cell	is	
a	 part	 of	 the	 Golgi	 apparatus	 (rather	 than,	 e.g.,	 of	 the	 endoplasmic	 reticulum)	 because	 it	
contributes	to	the	processing	and	transport	of	proteins.	A	particular	DNA	sequence	out	of	the	
billions	of	possible	sequences	is	a	part	of	the	human	genome	because	it	plays	a	causal	role	in	
the	 human	 genome	 as	 a	 whole,	 that	 is,	 because	 it	 contributes	 to	 gene	 expression	 or	
regulation	(Kaiser	forthc.).	Glia	cells	are	not	parts	of	the	central	nervous	system	because	they	
do	not	directly	participate	in	synaptic	interactions	and	electrical	signaling;	rather,	glia	cells	are	
parts	of	the	brain	because	they	provide	physical	support	for	neurons	and	regulate	the	internal	
environment	of	the	brain.	An	amino	acid	sequence	or	protein	region	is	a	part	of	ATP	synthase	
because	 it	 is	 necessary	 to	 the	 protein’s	 function	 of	 synthesizing	 ATP	 through	 transporting	
protons.	A	 leukocyte	or	antibody	 is	a	part	of	an	 immune	system	because	 it	 is	crucial	 to	 the	
protection	 of	 an	 organism	 against	 diseases.	 A	 cotton	 ball	 left	 inside	 the	 stomach	 during	
surgery	 is	 not	 a	 part	 of	 the	 human	 because	 it	 does	 not	 contribute	 to	 the	 survival	 of	 the	
human,	but	 rather	 impedes	 it	 if	 an	 infection	occurs.	Harmless	 strains	of	 E.	 coli	 bacteria	are	
parts	of	the	human	gut	because	they	facilitate	the	survival	of	humans	by	producing	vitamin	K2	
and	preventing	colonization	of	the	intestine	with	pathogenic	bacteria.	
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	 These	paradigmatic	examples	 reveal	 that	we	cannot	understand	 the	 conditions	under	
which	 biological	 part-whole	 relations	 hold	 if	 we	 consider	 biological	 objects	 and	 their	
properties	only.	We	must	also	take	into	account	the	processes	in	which	parts	and	wholes	are	
involved	 and	 how	 these	 processes	 relate	 to	 each	 other,	 such	 as	 how	 the	 binding	 of	 a	
particular	DNA	sequence	to	a	transcription	factor	contributes	to	the	regulation	of	genes	of	the	
human	 genome.15	 My	 account	 of	 biological	 parthood	 thus	 stands	 in	 the	 tradition	 of	
philosophies	that	emphasize	the	importance	of	processes	and	of	activities	(which	I	take	to	be	
subtypes	 of	 processes;	 Kaiser	 2017)	 to	 the	 biological	 world	 (Dupré	 2012;	 O’Malley	 2014;	
Machamer,	Darden,	and	Craver	2000).16	
	 The	above	examples	suggest	that	biological	parts	must	be	involved	in	processes	(which	I	
will	refer	to	as	 ‘parts-processes’)	that	are	 in	a	certain	sense	relevant	to	–	 i.e.,	contribute	to,	
are	necessary	to,	play	a	causal	role	in,	are	crucial	to	–	one	or	more	processes	that	the	whole	
engages	 in	 (which	 I	will	 refer	 to	 as	 ‘whole-processes’).	 In	 the	 following	 sections,	 I	 turn	 this	
rough	idea	into	a	specific,	clear	criterion	for	biological	parthood.	I	argue	that	we	should	think	
of	 the	 whole-processes	 to	 which	 parts-processes	 must	 be	 relevant	 as	 the	 characteristic	
behaviors	of	biological	 objects,	 such	as	 the	 characteristic	behaviors	of	 a	Golgi	 apparatus	 to	
process	and	transport	proteins	(Section	4.1).	I	then	draw	attention	to	the	parts-processes	and	
explain	why	we	cannot	understand	biological	parthood	by	considering	parts-processes	alone	
(Section	4.2).	Finally,	 I	use	Mackie’s	 (1965)	 idea	of	 INUS-conditions	 to	specify	 the	 relevance	
relation	that	must	hold	between	parts-	and	whole-processes	(Section	4.3).	
	
4.1	 Characteristic	Behaviors	of	Biological	Wholes	
Plausibly,	not	any	arbitrary	process	of	the	whole	should	determine	what	its	parts	are	because	
the	 whole	 might	 be	 involved	 in	 some	 processes	 only	 accidentally	 or	 exceptionally.	 For	
example,	a	lichen	growing	on	the	wall	of	a	playground	might	be	painted	blue	by	school	kids	
but	this	is	not	a	process	in	which	a	lichen	is	typically	involved.	HIV	might	damage	the	immune	
system	 of	 a	 person	 suffering	 from	 AIDS	 but	 this	 process	 is	 not	 characteristic	 of	 human	
immune	systems,	in	general.		
	 Processes	 of	 this	 kind	 can	 be	 excluded	 by	 introducing	 the	 notion	 of	 a	 characteristic	
behavior	 of	 a	 biological	 object.	 Characteristic	 behaviors	 are	 processes	 in	which	 a	 biological	
object	engages	very	generally,	that	 is,	under	a	wide	range	of	contexts	 in	which	the	object	 is	
naturally	 found.	 For	 instance,	 a	 sunflower	 grows	 and	 attracts	 bees	 and	 other	 insects	 to	
promote	its	reproduction	whether	it	stands	in	my	garden,	on	a	sunflower	farm	or	at	the	edge	
of	a	grain	field.	Characteristic	behaviors	determine,	at	least	in	part,	the	character	or	nature	of	
a	biological	object.	For	example,	the	functional	nature	of	an	ATP	synthase	is	to	use	a	proton	
                                                
15	Note	 that	my	 focus	 is	 still	 on	objects	 as	 the	 relata	of	 part-whole	 relations.	 There	might	 also	be	part-whole	
relations	between	processes	but	this	is	not	the	focus	of	this	paper.	My	claim	is	that	if	we	accept	objects	as	the	
relata	we	have	to	take	into	account	processes	as	well.	
16	With	 respect	 to	part-whole	 relations,	Gillett	 (2013)	argues	 that	we	must	adopt	a	dimensioned	account	 that	
considers	not	only	individual	objects	but	also	their	properties,	powers	and	the	processes	they	engage	in.	
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gradient	 to	 synthesize	 ATP,	 which	 is	 why	 molecules	 of	 this	 kind	 have	 been	 named	 ‘ATP	
synthase’.	Contrary	 to	mechanisms,	which	are	always	 for	a	 single	behavior	 (Glennan	2002),	
most	 biological	 objects	 are	 characterized	 by	 more	 than	 one	 typical	 behavior.	 Cells,	 for	
example,	 divide,	 synthesize	 proteins,	 and	 grow.	 Which	 behaviors	 are	 characteristic	 of	 a	
particular	biological	object	depends	also	on	the	kind	to	which	it	belongs	(recall	Section	2.2).	
Blood	 cells,	 for	 instance,	 exhibit	 other	 characteristic	 behaviors	 than	 muscle	 cells	 or	 than	
infected	host	cells.	
	 Characteristic	 behaviors	 of	 biological	 objects	 will	 often	 be	 realizations	 of	 biological	
functions.	The	realization	of	the	function	of	the	heart	to	pump	blood,	 for	 instance,	 is	also	a	
characteristic	behavior	of	 the	heart.	 Likewise,	 the	 characteristic	behaviors	of	 a	 stem	cell	 to	
differentiate	into	specific	kinds	of	cells,	to	synthesize	proteins,	and	to	grow	might	be	seen	as	
realizations	 of	 functions	 of	 a	 stem	 cell.	 However,	 I	 prefer	 to	 speak	 about	 characteristic	
behaviors	 rather	 than	 about	 functions.	 Many	 etiological	 theories	 of	 biological	 function	
prioritize	 organisms	 and	 their	 characteristic	 behaviors	 to	 survive	 and	 to	 reproduce	 (e.g.,	
Neander	1991).	Such	a	 restricted	 focus	 impedes	our	understanding	of	biological	part-whole	
relations	because	biological	wholes	are	not	confined	 to	 the	 level	of	organisms	and	because	
even	 organisms	 display	 other	 characteristic	 behaviors	 than	 survival	 and	 reproduction	 (e.g.,	
growth).	Cummins’	causal	role	theory	of	function	(1975)	seems	to	provide	an	understanding	
of	the	concept	of	a	biological	function	that	is	much	more	adequate	to	the	present	purposes.	
However,	 also	 Cummins’	 account	 must	 be	 applied	 to	 biological	 part-whole	 relations	 with	
caution	since	it	is	misleading	in	some	ways.	Most	importantly,	Cummins	argues	that	functions	
are	dispositions	or	capacities,	not	processes	(1975,	757).	But	the	mere	disposition	to	engage	
in	a	process	seems	not	 to	be	sufficient	 to	an	object	being	a	biological	part	 (more	on	this	 in	
Section	5).	A	mitochondrion,	for	instance,	is	a	biological	part	of	a	cell	because	it	produces	ATP	
not	because	it	has	the	disposition	to	produce	ATP,	which	may	never	be	manifested.17		
	
4.2	 Working	Parts	
Understanding	 the	conditions	under	which	part-whole	relations	 in	 the	biological	 realm	hold	
requires	 taking	 into	 account	 not	 only	 the	 processes	 in	which	wholes	 engages	 but	 also	 the	
processes	 in	 which	 parts	 are	 involved.	 For	 instance,	 it	 is	 the	 process	 of	 a	 specific	 DNA	
sequence	binding	certain	 transcription	 factors	 that	 is	 relevant	 to	 the	 regulation	of	genes	of	
the	human	genome	and	it	is	the	process	of	antibodies	recognizing	and	neutralizing	pathogens	
that	 is	 relevant	 to	 the	 protection	 of	 an	 organism	 against	 diseases.	 This	 is	 the	 point	where	
causation	enters	the	scene.	Many	of	the	parts-processes	will	be	causal	processes	that	involve	
                                                
17	 Furthermore,	 Cummins	 (1975)	 states	 that	 functions	 are	 individuated	 with	 respect	 to	 the	 capacity	 of	 a	
containing	system.	Accordingly,	Cummins’	functions	are	features	of	parts	which	they	possess	in	virtue	of	being	
parts	of	a	whole	(the	containing	system).	Cummins’	account	thus	applies	very	naturally	to	characterizing	parts-
processes	 as	 functions	 (if	 we	 ignore	 the	 capacity-process	 difference).	 By	 contrast,	 characterizing	 whole-
processes	 (i.e.,	characteristic	behaviors	of	wholes)	as	Cummins’	 functions	would	require	positing	an	additional	
whole,	which	contains	the	original	whole	as	a	part.	
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not	a	 single	biological	part	but	 causal	 interactions	between	 two	or	more	biological	parts	of	
the	 same	 whole	 (e.g.,	 the	 DNA	 sequence	 interacting	 with	 transcription	 factors,	 or	 the	
antibodies	 interacting	 with	 pathogens).	 In	 a	 similar	 vein,	 van	 Inwagen	 has	 argued	 that	
“parthood	essentially	involves	causation”	(1990,	81).18	
	 The	observation	that	causal	 interactions	are	central	to	biological	parts	and	wholes	has	
led	 several	 authors	 to	 defend	what	 can	 be	 called	 the	 intensity-of-interactions	 approach	 to	
biological	 parthood	 (Simon	 1962;	 Wimsatt	 1972,	 2007;	 Haugeland	 1998;	 McShea	 2000;	
McShea	and	Venit	2001).	The	basic	idea	of	this	approach	is	that	we	can	decompose	a	system	
into	parts	according	to	the	principle	that	interactions	among	parts	are	generally	weaker	and	
less	frequent	than	interactions	within	parts.	For	instance,	different	molecules	in	a	cell	can	be	
distinguished	 from	 another	 because	 the	 atoms	 inside	 of	 each	 molecule	 interact	 more	
frequently	and	stronger	with	themselves	(e.g.,	they	form	certain	kinds	of	chemical	bindings),	
rather	 than	 for	 instance	 with	 atoms	 that	 belong	 to	 different	 molecules.	 The	 intensity-of-
interactions	approach	has	initial	plausibility	but	it	encounters	some	serious	objections.	Most	
importantly,	 the	 approach	 overlooks	 that	 biological	 parts	 are	 not	 only	 determined	 by	 the	
intensity	 of	 causal	 interactions	 in	 and	 among	 parts	 but	 also	 by	 specific	 features	 of	 the	
whole.19	 In	Section	3,	 I	argued	that	biological	wholes	spatially	constrain	the	 individuation	of	
their	biological	parts	through	the	natural	boundaries	they	possess.	 In	the	next	section,	 I	will	
argue	that	biological	parts	must	be	involved	in	causal	interactions	that	are	relevant	at	least	to	
one	 of	 the	 characteristic	 behaviors	 of	 the	 whole.	 If	 we	 consider	 the	 strength	 of	 causal	
interactions	only,	we	overlook	this	directedness	of	causal	interactions	to	the	behaviors	of	the	
whole.	
	 To	conclude,	 considering	only	 the	processes	 in	which	parts	engage	 is	not	 sufficient	 to	
understanding	biological	part-whole	relations.	Instead,	we	must	analyze	how	parts-processes	
relate	to	whole-processes	and	what	makes	biological	parts	to	“working	parts”	(Mellor	2008,	
68)	that	work	to	bring	about	one	of	the	characteristic	behaviors	of	the	whole.	
	
4.3	 Specifying	the	Relevance	Condition	
Biologists	conceive	of	a	vesicle	as	a	biological	part	of	the	Golgi	apparatus	if	 it	contributes	to	
the	processing	and	 transport	of	proteins.	E.	 coli	bacteria	are	 regarded	as	biological	parts	of	
the	human	gut	if	they	facilitate	the	survival	of	humans,	for	instance,	by	producing	vitamin	K2	
and	preventing	colonization	of	 the	 intestine	with	pathogenic	bacteria.	Neurobiologists	 treat	
glia	 cells	as	biological	parts	of	 the	brain	 rather	 than	of	 the	central	nervous	 system	because	
they	play	no	direct	 role	 in	electrical	 signaling	but	provide	physical	 support	 for	neurons	and	
                                                
18	 Van	 Inwagen	 thinks	 about	 causal	 interactions	 between	 simples,	 rather	 than	 between	 biological	 objects	 of	
various	kinds.	
19	 Other	 major	 objections	 are	 that	 the	 intensity-of-interactions	 approach	 requires	 specifying	 a	 threshold	 of	
number	and	intensity	of	interactions	above	which	they	are	included	and	under	which	they	are	excluded.	Such	a	
threshold	 seems	 arbitrary	 or	 highly	 context-dependent	 (Wimsatt	 1972).	 Furthermore,	 the	 intensity-of-
interactions	 approach	 fails	 to	 exclude	 non-parts	 or	 background	 conditions	 that	 possess	 relatively	 many	 and	
strong	interactions	to	other	parts	(e.g.,	Craver	2007,	143f).	
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regulate	the	 internal	environment	of	the	brain.	What	unifies	all	 these	paradigmatic	cases	of	
part-whole	relations	is	that	biological	parts	engage	in	processes	(e.g.,	a	vesicle	budding	off	the	
Golgi	apparatus	and	moving	towards	the	cell	membrane)	that	are	relevant	to	at	least	one	of	
the	 characteristic	 behaviors	 of	 the	 whole	 (e.g.,	 the	 Golgi	 apparatus	 transporting	 proteins).	
Under	which	conditions,	exactly,	is	the	relation	of	relevance	satisfied?	What	does	it	mean	that	
a	 part-process	must	 contribute	 to,	 play	 a	 role	 in,	 or	 be	 crucial	 to	 one	 of	 the	 characteristic	
behaviors	of	the	whole	(a	whole-process)?	The	philosophical	 literature	yields	different	 ideas	
that	one	could	pursue	further.	In	this	section,	I	briefly	introduce	the	major	ideas	and	point	out	
their	 shortcomings,	 before	 I	 then	 present	my	 own	 relevance	 condition,	which	 I	 refer	 to	 as	
compositional	relevance.		
	 One	idea	is	that	biological	parts	must	have	significant	causal	effects	on	the	properties	of	
the	whole	 such	 that	 they	 give	 the	whole	 a	 “causal	 unity”	 (Mellor	 2008,	 67).	 This	 is	 not	 an	
implausible	 idea	but	 it	does	not	help	 to	 specify	 the	 relevance	 condition	because	 it	 remains	
unclear	 what	 makes	 a	 causal	 effect	 significant	 and	 under	 which	 conditions	 causal	 unity	 is	
reached.	Gillett	argues	that	a	part-whole	relation	between	individual	objects	exists	only	if	the	
part	is	a	“member	of	a	spatiotemporally	related	team	of	individuals	many	of	whose	members	
bear	 powerful	 and/or	 productive	 relations	 to	 each	 other”	 (2013,	 321).	 Gillett	 nicely	 draws	
attention	to	the	fact	that	biological	parts	are	not	isolated	but	 jointly	working	parts	(see	also	
Fagan	 2012).	 However,	 the	 parthood	 criterion	 he	 specifies	 –	 namely	 that	 a	 biological	 part	
must	bear	powerful	and/or	productive	relations	to	other	parts	of	the	same	whole	–	runs	the	
risk	of	becoming	circular	(at	least	it	requires	that	other	parts	of	the	whole	are	already	fixed).	It	
also	 seems	 too	weak	because	 it	 does	not	 restrict	 the	 kinds	of	dispositions	 that	 a	biological	
part	must	have	and	the	kinds	of	processes	it	must	engage	in	(also	the	cotton	ball	 left	 inside	
my	 stomach	 during	 surgery,	 e.g.,	 has	 some	 dispositions	 and	 engages	 in	 some	 processes).	
Moreover,	 to	capture	cases,	 such	as	 inactive	parts,	Gillett	backs	away	 from	formulating	 the	
parthood	 criterion	 as	 a	 necessary	 condition.	 His	 account	 thus	 fails	 to	 provide	 a	 satisfying	
answer	to	the	central	question	under	which	conditions	a	biological	object	 is	a	member	of	a	
jointly	working	team.		
	 Craver’s	account	of	“constitutive	relevance”	 (2007,	139)	applies	to	the	components	of	
mechanisms	but	one	might	 suggest	 that	 its	mutual	manipulability	 condition	can	be	used	 to	
specify	also	the	sense	in	which	biological	parts	must	be	relevant	to	their	wholes.	The	mutual	
manipulability	 condition	 requires	 that	 the	 components	 of	 a	 mechanism	 (which	 are	 acting	
entities,	 i.e.,	material	objects	engaging	 in	processes	of	a	 specific	kind;	Kaiser	2017)	and	 the	
phenomenon	 that	 a	mechanism	 is	 responsible	 for	 (e.g.,	 an	 object-involving	 process;	 Kaiser	
and	 Krickel	 2016)	 must	 be	mutually	 manipulable.	 That	 is,	 some	 change	 in	 the	 component	
must	 change	 the	 phenomenon	 and	 vice	 versa.	 Craver’s	 mutual	 manipulability	 condition	 is	
criticized,	for	instance,	for	being	epistemic	rather	than	metaphysical	because	it	specifies	how	
researcher	get	evidence	about	the	components	of	mechanisms,	rather	than	specifying	which	
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features	in	the	world	determine	component-mechanism	relations	(Couch	2011).20	Even	more	
importantly,	Craver’s	account	of	constitutive	relevance	requires	components	and	mechanistic	
phenomena	not	only	to	be	mutually	manipulable	but	also	to	be	related	as	parts	and	wholes.21	
Using	 the	 mutual	 manipulability	 criterion	 to	 specify	 biological	 parthood	 thus	 introduces	 a	
vicious	circularity	into	Craver’s	account	of	constitutive	relevance.	
	 In	the	early	literature	on	functional	explanation	and	functional	analysis,	Hempel	(1965)	
and	Nagel	(1961)	put	forward	the	idea	that	a	biological	part	must	be	a	bearer	of	a	function	in	
the	sense	that	it	must	have	certain	effects	that	contribute	to	some	activity	of	the	containing	
system,	the	whole	(cf.	Cummins	1975,	741).	Much	of	the	discussion	focuses	on	the	question	
of	 whether	 the	 effects	 that	 biological	 parts	 have	 on	 their	 wholes	 can	 be	 understood	 as	
necessary	conditions,	such	as	the	heart	circulating	blood	might	be	a	necessary	condition	for	
the	proper	working	of	the	organism.	However,	counterexamples	such	as	artificial	pumps	show	
that	 a	 heart	 pumping	 blood	 is	 not	 necessary	 for	 an	 organism’s	 survival,	 and	 even	 if	 one	
excludes	things	such	as	artificial	pumps	by	adding	the	phrase	‘under	normal	conditions’	one	
still	has	 to	 face	counterexamples	 such	as	 redundant	parts	 (e.g.,	 the	 second	kidney	which	 is	
not	necessary	for	the	organisms	survival	but	is	a	biological	part	of	it)	and	relevant	non-parts	
(e.g.,	the	case	of	the	caddisfly	larva	which	seem	to	be	necessary	for	the	larva’s	survival	but	is	
not	 a	 biological	 part	 of	 it).	 Still,	 the	 idea	 that	 biological	 parts	 must	 in	 a	 certain	 sense	 be	
necessary	to	their	wholes	is	appealing	because	it	may	give	rise	to	a	criterion	of	compositional	
relevance	that	is	specific	and	strong	enough.	
	 Mackie	(1965)	claims	that	we	should	understand	causes	as	INUS-conditions,	that	 is,	as	
being	 insufficient	 but	 necessary	 elements	 of	 overall	 conditions	 that	 are	 themselves	
unnecessary	but	sufficient	for	their	effects.	Mackie’s	idea	provides	us	with	a	promising	tool	to	
maintain	the	idea	that	biological	parts	must	be	necessary	to	their	wholes,	while	it	allows	us	to	
weaken	the	relevance	criterion	 in	a	way	that	 it	accounts	 for	cases,	such	as	redundant	parts	
(e.g.,	the	second	kidney)	and	collective	parts	(e.g.,	the	calcium	ions	in	a	muscle	fiber	that	only	
collectively	have	a	significant	effect	on	muscle	contraction).22	 I	have	argued	 in	 the	previous	
section	 that	we	 cannot	 individuate	 biological	 parts	 by	 considering	 their	 causal	 interactions	
only,	as	the	intensity-of-interactions	approach	proposes.	Instead,	the	processes	in	which	parts	
engage	 (which	 comprise	 causal	 interactions)	 must	 be	 examined	 with	 regard	 to	 how	 they	
affect	the	characteristic	behaviors	of	the	whole.	The	contribution	that	a	part-process	makes	
to	one	of	the	characteristic	behaviors	of	the	whole	need	not	be	necessary	because	it	can	be	
redundant	(e.g.,	the	second	kidney	filtering	blood	is	not	necessary	for	the	human’s	survival)	or	
only	 collectively	 significant	 (e.g.,	 the	 transport	of	a	 single	 calcium	 ion	 into	 the	 sarcoplasmic	
reticulum	does	not	raise	the	electrostatic	potential).	Instead,	a	part-process	must	be	an	INUS-
                                                
20	Other	 objections	 can	 be	 found,	 for	 instance,	 in	Harbecke	 2010;	 Couch	 2011;	 Leuridan	 2012;	Harinen	 2014;	
Baumgartner	and	Gebharter	2016.	
21	More	specifically,	the	component-objects	X	must	be	parts	of	the	system	S	that	is	involved	in	the	phenomenon	
that	the	mechanism	is	responsible	for	(Craver	2007,	153;	Kaiser	and	Krickel	2016).	
22	 In	 a	 similar	 vein,	 Harbecke	 (2010)	 and	 Couch	 (2011)	 use	Mackie’s	 account	 to	 specify	 the	 conditions	 under	
which	an	acting	entity	is	a	component	of	a	mechanism.	
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condition	for	at	least	one	of	the	behaviors	that	the	whole	characteristically	displays.	That	is,	
biological	parts	must	engage	in	processes	that	are	necessary	members	of	a	minimal	subset	of	
parts-processes,	 which	 are	 jointly	 sufficient	 to	 a	 characteristic	 behavior	 of	 the	 whole.23	
Applying	Mackie’s	idea	of	INUS-conditions	to	the	question	of	biological	parthood	gives	rise	to	
the	following	second	criterion	for	biological	parthood.	
	
Compositional	Relevance	(CR)	
An	object	x,	which	engages	 in	biological	process	p,	 is	a	biological	part	of	an	object	y,	which	
shows	characteristic	behaviors	b1,…bn,	only	if	
(2)		 p	 is	 relevant	 to	 at	 least	one	of	b1,…bn,	 that	 is,	 p	makes	a	necessary	 contribution	 to	 a	
condition	that	is	minimally	sufficient	to	one	or	more	of	b1,…bn.	
	
CR	 is	 a	 clearly	 ontological	 criterion	 (contrary	 to,	 e.g.,	 Craver’s	 mutually	 manipulability	
condition)	because	 it	 specifies	how	 the	processes	 in	which	putative	biological	 parts	 engage	
must	relate	to	the	characteristic	behaviors	of	the	whole.	CR	is	also	more	specific	than	other	
approaches	 because	 it	 specifies	 precise	 conditions	 under	 which	 a	 (causal)	 process	 of	 a	
putative	part	is	relevant	to	a	whole.	In	other	words,	CR	specifies	the	conditions	under	which	
causal	effects	of	putative	parts	are	significant	(Mellor	2008)	and	the	conditions	under	which	
putative	parts	bear	powerful	and/or	productive	relations	to	each	other	(Gillett	2013).	
	
5	 The	Hard-Cases	Challenge	to	Monism	
The	goal	of	 this	paper	 is	 to	 specify	 the	general	 conditions	under	which	particular	biological	
objects	stand	in	a	part-whole	relation	to	each	other.	To	sum	up,	my	analysis	of	paradigmatic	
examples	from	biological	practice	reveals	two	criteria	for	biological	parthood.	
	
An	Account	of	Biological	Parthood	
An	object	x,	which	engages	 in	biological	process	p,	 is	a	biological	part	of	an	object	y,	which	
shows	characteristic	behaviors	b1,…bn,	if	and	only	if	
(1)		 Substantial	 Spatial	 Inclusion	 (SSI):	 if	 y	 has	 a	 natural	 boundary,	 x	 must	 be	 spatially	
located	inside	or	in	the	region	that	the	natural	boundary	occupies	and	
(2)		 Compositional	Relevance	(CR):	p	is	relevant	to	at	least	one	of	b1,…bn,	that	is,	p	makes	a	
necessary	 contribution	 to	 a	 condition	 that	 is	 minimally	 sufficient	 to	 one	 or	 more	 of	
b1,…bn.	
	
                                                
23	Compositional	relevance	thus	turns	out	to	be	a	subtype	of	causal	relevance	(if	one	accepts	Mackie’s	claim	that	
causes	are	INUS-conditions	for	their	effects).	Note,	however,	that	this	does	not	imply	that	biological	part-whole	
relations	 are	 special	 kinds	 of	 causal	 relations.	 Biological	 parts	must	 satisfy	 further	 criteria	 (e.g.,	 they	must	 be	
spatially	included	in	the	whole	in	a	substantial	way)	and,	thereby,	violate	conditions	that	many	authors	regard	as	
characteristic	of	causal	relations	(e.g.,	that	cause	and	effect	are	distinct).	
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This	 is	 a	monistic	 account	 of	 biological	 parthood	 because	 it	 specifies	 two	 criteria	 that	 are	
individually	necessary	and	jointly	sufficient	for	a	biological	part-whole	relation	to	exist.24	That	
is,	my	account	identifies	a	single	set	of	criteria	that	is	supposed	to	hold	for	any	object	in	the	
biological	world.		
	 My	analysis	also	shows	that	there	exist	certain	kinds	of	part-whole	relations	that	can	be	
referred	 to	 as	 ‘hard	 cases’	 because	 they	 place	 requirements	 on	 a	 monistic	 account	 of	
biological	parthood	that	pull	in	different	directions.	Understanding	what	these	hard	cases	are	
and	why	it	 is	so	difficult	to	account	for	them	at	once	sheds	light	on	the	merits	and	limits	of	
monism.		
	
Hard	Cases	for	an	Account	of	Biological	Parthood	
(1)	 Redundant	 parts	 (e.g.,	 kidney	 of	 humans	 removing	 waste	 products	 from	 the	 body):	
Some	biological	parts	are	redundant	because	there	are	other	token	objects	that	engage	
in	the	same	kind	of	process,	only	one	of	which	is	necessary	to	a	behavior	of	the	whole.	
(2)	 Irrelevant	parts	(e.g.,	appendix	of	humans):	Some	biological	parts	engage	in	processes	
that	are	irrelevant	to	any	characteristic	behavior	of	the	whole	(e.g.,	because	they	have	
become	non-functional	during	evolutionary	history).	
(3)	 Inactive	parts	(e.g.,	members	of	a	population	not	interbreeding):	Some	biological	parts	
do	not	actually	engage	in	relevant	processes;	they	merely	have	the	disposition	to	do	so,	
which	is	not	manifest.	
(4)	 Collective	 parts	 (e.g.,	 calcium	 ion	 in	 a	 muscle	 fiber	 being	 released	 into	 the	 cytosol):	
Some	biological	parts	only	collectively	have	a	significant	effect	on	 the	behavior	of	 the	
whole.	
(5)	 Relevant	non-parts	(e.g.,	case	of	a	caddisfly	larva	that	protects	it	from	predators):	Some	
biological	objects	engage	in	processes	that	are	relevant	to	the	behavior	of	the	whole	but	
are	treated	as	background	conditions	or	as	parts	of	the	context.	
	
How	does	my	account	of	biological	parthood	cope	with	these	hard	cases?	The	Compositional	
Relevance	(CR)	criterion	accounts	 for	redundant	parts	because	the	processes	 in	which	parts	
engage	need	not	be	necessary	to	one	of	the	characteristic	behaviors	of	the	whole,	they	must	
only	 be	 necessary	members	 of	 a	 set	 of	 biological	 parts,	which	 are	 sufficient	 to	 one	 of	 the	
characteristic	 behaviors	 of	 the	 whole.	 Each	 kidney	 of	 a	 human,	 for	 example,	 is	 an	 INUS-
condition	 for	 the	human’s	survival	–	even	though	they	are	not	necessary	parts	of	 the	same	
condition.	 Cases	 of	 collective	 parts	 do	 not	 present	 a	 problem	 for	 CR	 because	 even	 if	 a	
biological	part,	such	as	a	calcium	ion,	on	its	own,	lacks	a	significant	effect	on	the	contraction	
of	 a	muscle	 fiber	 it	 still	 belongs	 to	 an	 INUS-condition	 for	muscle	 contraction.	 CR	 is	 only	 a	
necessary	but	not	a	sufficient	condition	for	biological	parthood.	Cases	of	relevant	non-parts,	
                                                
24	In	what	follows	I	provide	support	for	the	claim	that	these	criteria	are	jointly	sufficient.	I	consider	and	dismiss	
additional	criteria	(e.g.,	common	origin/history	or	genetic	identity)	for	biological	parthood	because	they	are	not	
necessary.	
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such	as	the	blood	that	is	transported	to	the	heart	and	thus	is	an	INUS-condition	for	the	blood	
pumping	 of	 a	 heart,	 pass	 CR	 but	 are	 excluded	 by	 the	 Substantial	 Spatial	 Inclusion	 (SSI)	
criterion	because	only	 the	blood	 inside	 the	ventricles	and	atria	 is	 located	 inside	 the	natural	
boundary	of	the	heart.	This	is	a	major	reason	for	why	SSI	is	a	separate	criterion	for	biological	
parthood	that	cannot	be	reduced	to	CR.	
	 Inactive	parts	 present	 a	much	 stronger	 challenge	 to	CR	because	 they	only	 potentially	
engage	 in	processes	 that	 are	 INUS-conditions	 for	one	of	 the	 characteristic	behaviors	of	 the	
whole	 and	 thus	 call	 into	 question	 that	 CR	 is	 a	 necessary	 condition.	 For	 example,	 not	 all	
organisms	that	belong	to	a	particular	population	actually	 interbreed	with	other	members	of	
the	 population.	 The	 mere	 capacity	 to	 interbreed	 suffices	 to	 be	 a	 biological	 part	 of	 the	
population.	One	might	argue	that	examples	 like	this	require	that	CR	must	be	weakened,	for	
instance,	by	replacing	‘x	engages	in	biological	process	p’	by	‘x	has	the	disposition	to	engage	in	
biological	process	p’.	A	weakened	CR	criterion,	however,	invites	more	counterexamples	than	
it	 copes	 with	 because	 several	 non-parts	 would	 turn	 out	 to	 be	 relevant.	 T-helper	 cells,	 for	
example,	have	the	disposition	to	recognize	antigens	and	thus	would	count	as	biological	parts	
of	our	 immune	system.	 In	addition,	a	dispositionally	formulated	relevance	criterion	neglects	
the	fact	that	processes	are	central	to	biological	parthood	(recall	Section	4).		
	 Cases	of	 irrelevant	parts	also	challenge	 the	 status	of	CR	as	a	necessary	 condition.	 For	
example,	our	appendix	does	not	engage	in	processes	that	are	INUS-conditions	for	one	of	our	
characteristic	 behaviors,	 such	 as	 our	 survival,	 reproduction,	 reasoning	 or	 cooperation	 with	
others	but	we	typically	consider	our	appendix	to	be	a	biological	part	of	us.	Again,	one	might	
argue	that	examples	like	this	show	that	we	must	replace	CR	by	a	weaker	relevance	criterion.	
But	 if	 we	 weaken	 the	 relevance	 criterion	 we	 will	 face	 many	 new	 counterexamples	 of	
biological	objects	which	pass	the	weaker	relevance	criterion	but	which	we	do	not	regard	as	
biological	parts	(i.e.,	relevant	non-parts),	such	as	the	cotton	ball	that	is	left	inside	our	stomach	
during	surgery.	
	 Alternatively,	one	might	argue	that	the	two	criteria	that	I	present	in	this	paper	are	not	
sufficient	to	biological	parthood	and	must	be	supplemented	by	additional	necessary	criteria.	
In	 the	 case	of	 our	 appendix,	 for	 example,	 referring	 to	 the	 common	history	or	 origin	of	 the	
appendix	 and	 the	 human	 body	 as	 a	whole	 or	 to	 the	 genetic	 identity	 of	most	 of	 their	 cells	
might	provide	us	with	a	criterion	that	individuates	the	appendix	as	a	biological	part,	but	not	
the	cotton	ball	 inside	my	stomach	 (cf.	 Jansen	and	Schulz	2014).	The	 impression	 that	spatial	
and	causal-functional	relations	are	only	part	of	the	story	about	biological	part-whole	relations	
is	 confirmed	by	examples	 that	 show	how	some	biological	wholes	also	 structurally	 constrain	
their	parts.	For	example,	it	follows	from	the	chemical-structural	nature	of	the	human	genome	
(i.e.,	 from	 the	 fact	 that	 it	 is	 a	 nucleic	 acid)	 that	 its	 biological	 parts	 must	 be	 sequences	 of	
nucleotides	 rather	 than,	 for	 instance,	 proteins.25	 Each	 of	 these	 putative	 additional	 criteria,	
                                                
25	 Likewise,	 the	 structure	 of	 the	 Golgi	 apparatus	 implies	 that	 its	 parts	 must	 be	 membrane-enclosed	
compartments	 or	 vesicles,	 and	 a	 population	 of	 black-headed	 gulls	 consists	 only	 of	 organisms	 of	 the	 species	
Chroicocephalus	ridibundus	(not	of	the	beach	or	of	other	kinds	of	birds).	
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however,	 captures	only	 a	 small	 subset	of	 biological	 part-whole	 relations	 and	 thus	does	not	
constitute	 a	 necessary	 criterion	 that	 is	 universally	 applicable	 to	 the	 biological	 world.	 For	
instance,	only	some	biological	wholes	have	a	structural	nature	that	constrains	their	parts	in	a	
non-trivial	manner.26	The	criterion	of	genetic	identity	is	violated	in	many	cases	(e.g.,	genetic	
chimera,	 symbionts,	 ecosystems,	 etc.),	 and	 also	 the	 requirement	 that	 biological	 parts	must	
originate	 together	 with	 or	 inside	 the	 whole	 does	 not	 hold	 for	 the	 majority	 of	 part-whole	
relations	because	most	biological	objects	continuously	loose	and	acquire	particular	parts.	
	
6.	Conclusions:	On	the	Merits	and	Limits	of	Monism	
My	 analysis	 of	 hard	 cases	 reveals	 at	 which	 point	 monism	 reaches	 its	 limit.	 For	 a	monistic	
account	 of	 biological	 parthood,	 it	 is	 impossible	 to	 cope	with	 all	 hard	 cases	 at	 once.	 If	 you	
weaken	 the	 Compositional	 Relevance	 (CR)	 criterion	 to	 account	 for	 irrelevant	 parts	 and	
inactive	parts,	 you	will	 not	 be	 able	 to	 exclude	 several	 cases	of	 relevant	 non-parts	 (and	 the	
other	way	round).	You	might	solve	the	problem	by	introducing	additional	criteria	that	capture	
other	 kinds	 of	 constraints	 on	 biological	 part-whole	 relations	 (e.g.,	 historical,	 genetic,	 or	
structural	constraints).	These	additional	criteria,	however,	will	apply	only	to	certain	kinds	of	
biological	objects	and	not	hold	universally.	The	goal	of	universality	thus	runs	contrary	to	the	
goal	of	descriptive	adequacy	(Kaiser	2015,	Chapter	2)	and	 it	seems	as	 if	we	need	to	make	a	
principled	decision	at	this	point	–	 in	favor	of	more	descriptive	adequacy	and	pluralism	or	 in	
favor	of	more	universality	and	monism.		
	 Among	the	virtues	of	my	monistic	account	is	that	it	gives	a	clear	and	precise	answer	to	
the	 general	 question	 under	 which	 conditions	 one	 biological	 object	 is	 a	 part	 of	 another	
biological	object.	Monism	highlights	the	commonalities	of	part-whole	relations	from	different	
levels	of	organization	(e.g.,	a	vesicle	being	a	part	of	a	Golgi	apparatus	and	an	organisms	being	
a	part	of	a	population)	and	it	reveals	how	biological	wholes	in	general	constrain	their	parts.	A	
monistic	account	of	biological	parthood	thus	provides	unification.	On	the	other	hand,	monism	
runs	 the	 risk	 of	 yielding	 an	 overly	 simple	 and	 descriptively	 inadequate	 view	 of	 biological	
parthood,	which	fails	to	account	for	the	diversity	of	biological	part-whole	relations,	reflected	
in	the	various	approaches	that	biologists	adopt	to	individuate	part-whole	relations	(cf.	Kellert,	
Longino,	and	Waters	2006).		
	 The	 goal	 of	 this	 paper	 is	 not	 to	 defend	 my	 monistic	 account	 against	 pluralistic	
alternatives.	Rather,	 I	presuppose	 the	goal	of	monism,	defend	my	account	against	monistic	
alternatives,	and	use	my	analysis	to	point	out	the	limits	that	monism	faces.	Recognizing	these	
limits	allows	us	to	distinguish	general	constraints	on	biological	parthood	from	constraints	that	
arise	 more	 locally	 and	 it	 helps	 us	 to	 specify	 in	 how	 far	 the	 individuation	 of	 part-whole	
                                                
26	One	might	argue,	for	example,	that	the	heart	might	can	be	structurally	characterized	as	having	two	ventricles,	
two	 atria,	 connected	 by	 valves,	 etc.	 This	 structural	 description,	 however,	 is	 nothing	 but	 a	 description	 of	 the	
biological	parts	of	the	heart.	
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relations	in	the	biological	world	is	diverse.	Understanding	the	limits	of	monism	thus	allows	us	
to	draw	general	conclusions	about	the	nature	of	biological	parthood.	
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